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Abstract – Research Summary: 
Our paper attends to the implied outlooks (‘philosophies’ in the sense of operative practical 
discourses and assumptions) and the competing ethical concerns that animate differing views on 
privatizing corrections. We consider some normative arguments and empirical observations that 
have been mobilized for and against privatization since the inception of the modern version of 
this debate in the late 1980s, and seek to place these in the context of accounts of penal problems 
over that contentious period. We argue that a multidimensional approach to understanding the 
sociology of punishment and in particular how certain forms of punishment persist, survive and 
thrive is required when considering the privatization of corrections. Such an approach raises 
quizzical questions regarding the pairing together of punishment and privatization, and seeks to 
sharpen discussion about future prospects.   
 
Policy Implications:  
Greater attention must be paid towards public involvement, knowledge and understanding about 
penal policies. With particular regard to the involvement of private sector actors and interests, 
this has implications both at the initial contract negotiation stages of expanding correctional 
privatization as well as the rescission of such contracts. The impact of penal arrangements on the 
dignity and integrity of offenders – especially but not only prison inmates - their loved ones and 
communities, and wider considerations of public interest, are abiding and unresolved concerns, 
and privatization policies must be evaluated in light of these.  
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The story of the privatization of penal institutions and services is not new. Indeed, Malcolm 
Feeley has argued on a number of occasions over many years (for example 1991; 2014) that the 
association between penal practices and private enterprise is a remarkably extended, embedded 
and extensive one. For Feeley the implication of this long-standing involvement is that simple 
rejectionist arguments based on the alleged incompatibility between the state-mandated 
phenomenon of criminal punishment and the many and diverse roles of commercial actors are 
implausible (see further Harding and Rynne, this issue).  
Feeley, however, also notes that the particular roles and contributions of private enterprise in 
respect of punishment have long included those of introducing innovative practices and 
techniques, and thereby of extending states’ penal capacity and reach. Such admonitions should 
alert us to the difficulty and scope of the task we confront in this paper. If we think (and we do 
think this) that there are special normative problems posed by private sector involvement in 
penal affairs we had better be on our mettle in identifying these. It would be wise not to assume 
that we can simply eliminate everything that is ‘private’ from the penal realm, and in so doing 
somehow solve its multitude of moral, political and practical problems. At the same time, the 
nature of the phenomena under discussion is ever-mutating. If we are to speak illuminatingly 
about them it is these practices and these institutions – the ones we confront now or that are 
coming into being now – with which we must reckon. For this reason, discussion of the 
philosophical and ethical questions posed by privatizing corrections and the changing scope and 
challenges of contemporary penality cannot meaningfully be separated.  
‘Privatization’, as the essays collected in this volume make apparent, is a singular term for a 
many-sided phenomenon, and for this reason its use sometimes threatens to obscure rather than 
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clarify. It is used to refer to the actions of large, profit-seeking corporations and small social 
enterprises and non-profit agencies. It refers equally to the for-profit management of prisons (its 
most obvious as well as most contentious form) and to a wide range of other phenomena from 
non-custodial supervision, notably in the form of electronic monitoring for example, to the 
collection of fines and other monies, to the provision of a host of ancillary services. It should be 
handled with care, therefore. Some of its manifestations may not brook large in many people’s 
lists of the most controversial aspects of criminal justice practices. Some may be welcomed, in 
some quarters at least, as sources of innovation, progress, and liberalization. Others, however, 
may raise pointed questions about delegated authority, accountability, the expansion of the scope 
of the penal network and many other questions. As will become apparent in this essay, we think 
Feeley is probably quite right to argue that we cannot simply reject ‘it’ out of hand, for it is not 
one thing. Nonetheless, it may be premature to think that key questions of principle have been all 
resolved (often they have simply been put aside because private sector involvement has become 
more familiar and less questioned).  
 
Privatization, Contemporary Penality and its Policy Dilemmas 
Notwithstanding its long history debates about the merits of penal privatization, such debates 
have intensified in recent decades and taken on a particular form (Lindsey et al., 2016). The 
contours of those debates took shape about thirty years ago when a novel-looking and intensely 
controversial proposition – the management of entire prisons on a for-profit basis – began to be 
seriously entertained in some advanced liberal democracies (for the first time since the 
eighteenth century, that is). The antecedents to which Feeley and others refer barely prepared 
many of those concerned (the criminologists perhaps no less than the administrators, 
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practitioners, judges, legislators) for that shock, nor for its many sequels in respect of probation 
supervision, electronic monitoring and the rest. What was and is really at stake in those 
arguments? Where does the debate stand now? And what does the current scope and reach of 
private sector involvement in penal matters portend for the future?   
One problem, we argue, with the condition of recent debates on this issue, is precisely that the 
sheer ubiquity of privatizations (even if the private management of prisons as such has not swept 
the world to quite the extent once predicted) has latterly served to suppress explicit normative 
discussion. In many cases – with the partial exception of the for-profit management of prisons – 
they have become largely (largely, but as show further below, not wholly) unquestioned parts of 
the penal landscape in many of the jurisdictions where they exist. Where once there was 
vehement disagreement between arch proponents of opposing views (such as DiIulio (1988) 
versus Logan (1990)) now there is an established industry and some official letting contracts. 
Certainly, there is still an opposition, but the tendency has been for the issue to get swept up by 
the tsunami of mass incarceration and for the specificity of the case against or on behalf of 
privatization to be submerged in the resulting flood.   
One possible outcome of this circumstance is that we attribute too much independent causal 
influence to privatization. In the case of private prisons, we might mistake a delivery system that 
has never housed more than 10 per cent of the inflated prison population of the United States for 
the primary motor of growth of the system as whole, something that in reality has much more 
complex, distributed and far-reaching causes. This is the basis of Wacquant’s well-known and 
widely-debated critique of the thesis of the ‘prison-industrial complex’, for example (Wacquant, 
2009: 84-7).  
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Another possible problem, however, is that if we make the question of prison numbers the sole or 
primary focus we miss much else that is also qualitatively and normatively important regarding 
the legitimacy or otherwise of punishment and problems of justification, purpose, dignity and 
coercion in its enactment. Moreover, we need equally alert and careful attention to the sheer 
range and complexity of private actors involved in the shallower and less visible parts of the 
penal realm (whether in the classical form of delegation of supervision or enforcement to for-
profit enterprises, or in the endless shape-shifting variety of any number of public-private-
voluntary ‘partnership’ arrangements; see further McNeill (2018) on the emergent forms of 
‘mass supervision’).  
In this context, therefore, even raising the idea of a philosophical conversation concerning 
privatization feels faintly old-fashioned. Yet this apparent reversion, we suggest, is precisely 
what is needed now. In revisiting this matter we have the opportunity to pursue a number of 
objectives in what we hope is a helpful way. The language of philosophy and ethics of course 
raises questions of normative justification, but in this context it refers mainly to disagreement at 
the level of declared principles about what should or should not be done here and now in the 
name of public policy. (As it turns out, it makes a real difference in this context where ‘here’ is.) 
Secondly, these terms also denote underlying or implicit assumptions at work in the operation of 
particular forms of social practice and the effort involved in bringing these to the fore. 
‘Philosophies’ in this sense are the discourses that get activated in the operation of actually 
existing systems and institutions and the forms of penal action that compose them. What then are 
the respective roles and functions of public authorities and private providers in the penal realm 
that we now inhabit, and what new forms and assemblages are they bringing into being? How do 
we judge and assess these? What considerations of legitimacy, propriety, intended effects and 
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unintended consequences do they pose for us? In what follows, we actively try to bring these 
together, because the discourses and the real-world practices are, jointly, our topic. The question 
“What shall we do next?” is not answerable without first attending to the question “What is 
going on?”1 
 
Privatization, Punitiveness, and the Question of how Punishment is Administered  
While it is inherently difficult to measure punitiveness, “it is common currency amongst 
criminologists that, if imprisonment rates are employed as a barometer, America is the most 
punitive country in the world” (Teague, 2016: 100). That is to say, the United States has, 
notoriously, consistently experienced rates of incarceration several times greater than those of its 
cultural neighbors and comparators, such as Canada and even the United Kingdom (the case with 
which it is most often bracketed), at least since the 1970s. Explanations for variations in prison 
populations abound, and certainly exceed our scope here (see, amongst many, Lacey 2008; 
Lacey et al., 2017). It seems unavoidable that population pressures play a significant role in 
shaping the decisions of policy-makers to experiment with privatizing prisons and other penal 
sanctions and measures. It might be no more than a pragmatic adjustment to a pressing reality on 
the part of policy-makers that they should reach for a solution that appears to them to offer 
                                                          
1 This effort relates to each of our work in particular ways. Richard Sparks was an active participant in an earlier 
phase of debates on the privatization of prisons (Sparks, 1994, 1995, 2001). As someone who articulated what he 
saw as irreconcilable objections to that development he ‘lost’ the argument, in the sense of finding himself on the 
wrong side of an historical current. He has written little overtly on the subject since, though a good deal on the 
question of conditions of legitimacy in relation to prisons. James Gacek has recently completed a doctoral thesis on 
electronic monitoring in contemporary Scotland, a measure that is wholly provided by one private contractor (G4S). 
James’s work concerns the experience of delivering and receiving this form of supervision, and the texture of the 
new form of carcerality that it creates (Gacek, 2019). This is precisely an example of Feeley’s new techniques and 
modalities of punishment. So for James the question of what forms of penal subjectivity (and subjection) are brought 




additional capacity rapidly and at an acceptable cost, or one which they see as providing more 
scope for innovation and improvement than existing and notoriously inflexible state-governed 
institutions.  Early commentators on the privatization movement in the United States in the 
1990s noted that the idea of addressing a growing crisis of prison space was central to the 
marketing pitches of the companies involved (see for example Lilly and Knepper (1992)).2  
Yet this alone hardly seems sufficient to account for why some jurisdictions have gone so much 
further, faster than others. Thus, to take the example of the two other countries mentioned above: 
Canada and the United Kingdom have faced somewhat similar population pressures over the last 
few decades. However, Canada has had very little engagement with private prisons (and 
currently has none), whereas England and Wales (by far the largest of the three United Kingdom 
prison systems) was an early adopter and has remained committed to (and dependent on) private 
sector involvement for well over two decades and through many vicissitudes. It thus seems likely 
that the responses of authorities to such practical challenges is at least mediated by or has some 
clear elective affinity with dominant philosophical or ideological outlooks. To some decision-
makers, in some times and places this presents itself as a credible, and perhaps in principle 
preferable, solution (whereas to others it remains foreclosed). How shall we explain or interpret 
this? 
One line of explanation is that we have tended to see a high level of interest in privatization in 
“‘neoliberal’ Anglophone jurisdictions [exemplifying]…the adoption of…punitive and 
politicized approach[es] to crime and punishment” (Jones and Newburn, 2013: 439). Therefore, 
on one hand it is widely argued that the USA and the UK are among those countries which “have 
                                                          
2 Many readers will likely equate the term ‘privatized corrections’ to ‘private prisons.’ Therefore, we wish to clarify 
and note that the points made in this paper apply to all types of corrections and not just prisons.   
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the highest incarceration rates, not least because of the impact of their political and economic 
structures” (Teague, 2016: 100). On the other they have often favored private-sector solutions to 
the resulting problems because their ideological preferences have latterly included “maximum 
marketization of government services” (Aman and Greenhouse, 2014: 365). The relevant ideas 
and policy innovations circulate widely, including particularly readily across the Atlantic 
(typically in one direction; that is, imported to the UK from the USA) (Newburn, 2002; Jones 
and Newburn, 2006, 2013). 
No doubt the idea of neo-liberalism is often deployed too broadly and imprecisely in these 
discussions. Nevertheless, there remain good reasons to think that those contemporary societies 
most influenced by free-market ideas, with more deregulated labour markets, less inclusionary 
social policies and, importantly, more volatile and adversarial political cultures are more likely 
both to be drawn to expansionist tough-on-crime policies (Lacey et al., 2017) and to market-
based solutions to the resulting steering and capacity problems, such as the privatization of penal 
institutions and services. Under such conditions the idea that the state purchases correctional 
work (in much the same way as it contracts for construction projects or perhaps for aspects of 
health or social care provision) becomes more readily thinkable and comes to be seen as having 
the distinct advantages of competition and contractual regulation3. Seen from within that horizon 
there is no longer a significant moral problem. The allocation of punishment by a legitimate 
authority (the imposition of a criminal sentence in a court of law) has been separated 
conceptually from its execution, which can be sub-divided into a series of practical tasks carried 
out by skilled providers under its supervision and competing with one another for its business 
                                                          
3 As Amy Ludlow shows with respect to the privatization of prisons in England and Wales, once the primary 
decisions have been taken the debates tend to shift as much to matters of public procurement, labor and competition 
policies as to criminal justice policy properly so-called (Ludlow, 2017).  
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(Sparks, 1995). In order for that set of decisions to be viewed as philosophically and ethically 
problematic it has to be viewed from a perspective external to that set of premises. In other 
words, arguments for and against privatization may incorporate all kinds of claims and counter-
claims about cost, practicality and effectiveness, but they are in the last instance contests over 
legitimacy between proponents of different ideologies of politics and law (see further Loader and 
Sparks, 2016).  
Our contention that we need to situate privatization debates within the broader sociology of 
punishment rests on the view that we can thereby better understand how privatization and 
punishment came to be coupled together and to be viewed as social practices that are seen in 
some places as legitimate and continuing, but in others as largely unacceptable. A sociology of 
punishment allows us to further explore “the function punishment fills, the effects it produces 
and the meanings it communicates” (Daems, 2011: 806). In this spirit, a reconsideration of 
privatizing corrections becomes part and parcel of such efforts of comprehending how certain 
forms of punishment survive, thrive and extend, and thus how the persistence of such forms of 
punishment pervade society and come to represent a viable source of opportunities to the private 
sector. In other words, if we wish to grasp the bringing-together of this pair in a new light, we 
need to inspect them, as it were, from a greater distance: 
Instead of engaging with the institution, as everyone feels compelled (and surprisingly 
competent) to do, the social science strategy is to disengage, to avoid taking positions within 
the field of debate and instead to chart how the institution—and its debates—appeared when 
viewed from the outside. (Garland, 2010: 13; italics in original) 
Garland (2010) establishes this strategy in terms of understanding capital punishment in the 
USA, but we suggest it applies equally well within the realm of privatizing corrections. In other 
words, as Garland (1990: 10) put it on an earlier occasion: “we need to know what punishment is 
in order to think what it can and should be.”  
11 
 
In this sense the task is one of making the familiar appear strange (Garland, 1990). Indeed, 
asking ourselves why we punish, who deserves to be punished, and what are the benefits or 
consequences for society to punish, makes us consider the shifts in how we punish. Put 
differently, as Garland further argues, if penal practices always conjoin the mentalities and 
sensibilities of their time in particular ways, they thereby generate shifting stances on what can 
be construed as ethically acceptable. It is on this basis that we arrive at judgments as to which 
forms of punishment feel appropriate, just, or just plain cruel and unusual.  
Making these familiar questions appear strange also speaks to how certain forms of punishment – 
most notably perhaps the prison - have survived across and throughout widely different historical 
eras of punishment. In other words, competing views on privatization and punishment belong to 
different universes of discourse which speak to – and often uncomprehendingly past - each other 
in the same conversation. The overarching premise of the competing parties is generally that in 
some form or other punishment serves a legitimate societal function. To approach the issue in 
this way is to advocate the “reconnection of penological research with normative moral and 
political reflection” in order that we may seriously reconsider “the location of the penal within 
the variety of actual or possible political outlooks” (Sparks, 2001: 172). As one of us has 
previously argued, “the arguments over the justification of any practice of imprisonment (private 
or otherwise) need to be more strenuously pursued than contemporary rhetorics allow” (1994: 
14; italics in original). Taking the philosophical grounds and ethical considerations together, to 
privatize corrections beyond the conventional space of punishment (i.e. the prison) is to further 
expose and legitimize punishment’s necessity in our lives, a troubling concern revealed in our 




For and Against Privatizing Corrections: The Role of Ideologies and Beliefs 
Garland (1991: 120) argues that conventional penological and philosophical approaches to 
punishment base themselves on an implicit sociology of punishment, “insofar as they rely upon 
certain common-sense conceptions of what kind of institution punishment is and what kinds of 
social purposes it serves.” Irrespective of which rationale is deployed in order to justify imposing 
a punishment in any given time and place, there remains a deeper need to understand the 
complexities and inner ambivalences of punishment as a social institution, its obdurate 
persistence and thriving proliferation (Garland, 1991). As we observe below, particular 
ideologies and beliefs lay the foundation for particular punishments in society to persist, survive 
and thrive. Privatizing corrections, we believe, involves more than issues of cost-efficiency and 
service delivery; the philosophical framing of privatization that predominates at present obscures 
fundamental questions about why and how societies punish, and simultaneously eschews 
discussions of legitimacy for the sake of furthering the privatization movement.  
For example, the prison as a primary site of punishment is as at least as old as modern liberal and 
democratic states, yet it continues to face challenges over its legitimacy. As Mincke (2017: 236) 
indicates, human rights and prisons “were conceived in the same epoch (during the eighteenth 
century), but have always been in tension. Accordingly, thinkers and policy makers have 
constantly had to re-examine and consolidate the legitimacy of the latter.” The conception of the 
prison was meant to deprive its inmates of what was considered essential in and by liberal 
society – namely, their liberty and autonomy. However, the fact that the prison in the nineteenth 
century through to the start of the twenty-first century came to be considered by many to be 
“inefficient and, worse, counter-productive, lent it even less legitimacy” (Mincke, 2017: 236). 
Other scholars have also expressed concerns about the lack of attention given to correctional 
13 
 
philosophy and goals (for discussions pertaining specifically to private prisons see Shichor, 
1995; Harding, 1999; Schneider, 1999; Brakel and Gaylord, 2003; Schwartz and Nurge, 2004).  
Critics argue that private prisons are often operated and managed in a manner that is consistent 
“with the dominant correctional philosophy of incapacitation” (Wright, 2010: 76; see also 
Blakely and Bumphus, 2004). For example, some leading authorities in the US argue that the 
entire American penal system is currently based on rational choice and issues of cost (Cullen et 
al., 2002) and that privatization became a viable policy-choice only under this dominant 
correctional philosophy. Advocates of private imprisonment, and independent commentators 
sympathetic to it (Logan, 1992; McDonald, 1992; Feeley, 2014), on the other hand, have long 
argued that this is not a necessary association and that privatization is better thought of as a 
means of providing whatever the state mandates. That may, and sometimes does, include 
rehabilitative services at or above the level that public institutions have offered.  
The question is a central one, especially as it has become increasingly strongly argued that the 
incapacitative conception of imprisonment has become a primary driver of mass incarceration; 
and that the scale of imprisonment has created powerful economic incentives in the form of 
relatively secure employment especially in marginal rural areas of the United States (Thorpe, 
2016).  
One underlying issue – a key component of some of the ethical disputes discussed below – 
concerns the moral and political status of the imprisoned subject under different regimes of 
punishment (Duff and Marshall, 2016; Ramsay, 2016). Critics argue that in delegating the 
practical conduct of punishment to an agent, the state thereby passes on, at least in part, its 
responsibility for that person’s welfare. That intrinsically includes, it is further argued, 
compulsory and coercive dimensions (Sparks, 1995). Whether this can be done legitimately has 
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become central to arguments of constitutional principle as to whether the private management of 
prisons, or indeed any place of compulsory detention, is permissible in a number of countries 
(see below). 
The prison privatization movement gained particular momentum in parts of the United States in 
the 1980s, becoming “a sort of political common sense” as electorates, helped along by 
politicians and lobbyists, became simultaneously alerted to the scale of the crime problem and 
more aware of global economic competition (Aman and Greenhouse, 2014: 368; Price and 
Riccucci, 2005). Privatization efforts became noticeably stronger in southern and western US 
states as fiscal conservatism was held high and organized labour was weak (Pozen, 2003: 260). 
Privatization by contract became politically popular as an approach to the governmental 
provision of services, especially for the poor, for immigrants, and for prisoners—in other words, 
dependent populations whose situations expose them extensively to managed care of various 
kinds (Aman and Greenhouse, 2014: 267-268). Such efforts were coupled with the loss of faith 
in the ‘rehabilitative ideal’ which made it easier for states to hand over public prisons to private 
companies (Mehigan and Rowe, 2007: 359) and to reduce their commitments to deliver 
substance abuse counseling, vocational or educational training to inmates (Schartmueller, 2014: 
236).  
Overall, prison privatization has become an increasingly complex entity within the expanding 
carceral state, which we consider here as “a set of institutional configurations and actors that 
prioritize punishment, containment, detention, and/or incarceration for treating poverty and 
marginalization” (Villanueva, 2017: 150; see also Beckett and Murakawa, 2012; Peck, 2003; 
Wacquant, 2009). While some private companies provide services to state-run correctional 
facilities, others build prisons and lease them out to governments, and even still other private 
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companies design, build, and run the prison in its entirety (Schartmueller, 2014: 236). Some 
argue that privatization, in its most ideological form, makes government an ‘empty shell’ 
(Michelman, 2000), while others have noted that, in the context of corrections, privatization does 
not automatically challenge the idea of core governmental functions since it does not 
automatically remove the state altogether from the process (for example, see Genders, 2002). 
Indeed, setting up the contractual terms, standards, procedures for monitoring, corporate 
accountability, and conditions for rescission all remain with the state (Genders, 2002; see also 
Volokh, 2002; Aman and Greenhouse, 2014).  
Privatization proponents contend that that private companies have the ability to accomplish 
correctional goals more effectively and at a lower cost, provide higher quality services, and 
develop innovative solutions to correctional challenges at an increasingly qualitative and 
quantitative rate (for examples, see Logan, 1990; Calabrese, 1993; Lundahl et al., 2009). 
Conversely, critics indicate that effectiveness and efficiency of privatization is a myth; private 
correctional facilities do not result in cost savings (Sechrest and Shichor, 1996; Pratt and Maahs, 
1999; Perrone and Pratt, 2003) as privatization merely expands the penal net of social control 
which further increases pressure on correctional services, and does not improve correctional 
outcomes (Lundahl et al., 2009; Aman and Greenhouse, 2014; Ramirez, 2015). In fact, the 
general belief of this debate can be aptly summarized by Lindsey and colleagues’ (2016: 311) 
assertion that “[p]roponents of privatized corrections argue that there is too little of it, while 
opponents typically argue that there is too much of it or, in fact, no need for it.”  
The public’s admiration of private enterprise and distrust of government contributes to a 
common assumption that private prisons are thought to get the best results (and lower 
recidivism) than their public counterparts (Spivak and Sharp, 2008). However, evidence suggests 
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private prisons are not inherently more effective in reducing recidivism, which may be 
attributable to fewer visitation and rehabilitative programing opportunities for offenders 
incarcerated in private facilities (Duwe and Clark, 2013). As Duwe and Clark (2013: 391) 
contend, “findings from this evaluation and prior studies indicate that private prisons are not a 
superior alternative to [public] prisons…[I]f anything, […] private prisons produce slightly 
worse recidivism outcomes among the healthiest and well-behaved inmates for the same amount 
of money.”  
Despite the fact that privatized services can span both public and private corrections, we are 
mindful that the conceptual distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ is of value philosophically 
“in relation to the different accountabilities of government and business, to democracy, and to 
shareholders, respectively” (Aman and Greenhouse, 2014: 405). It thus seems more sensible to 
perceive privatization “not as an either/or option, but rather as a continuum of private-sphere 
involvement in the provision of correctional services” (Aviram, 2014: 434-435). However, in 
more pragmatic terms, public and private values and interests are distinct from one another, as 
government and businesses are held to different accountabilities and rationales, and both are 
subject to different formulations of success.  
Fitzgibbon and Lea (2014) also raise concerns about the privatization of probation. Allowing 
privatization to absorb probation, they contend, is akin to the general task of ‘public 
protection’—by which the ‘public’ is no more than the asset-rich middle class and those still in 
secure employment—by neutralizing the risk of crime and anti-social behaviour from the poor 
and unemployed: “Those recalcitrant to workfare will end up being effectively warehoused out 
of sight, somewhere along the ‘seamless’ continuum of prison and probation” (Fitzgibbon and 
Lea, 2014: 26; see also Wacquant, 2009; Worrall, 2008). Indeed, as Aviram (2014: 433) 
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suggests, a “privatization mentality” has become legitimated and much more pervasive and 
intrusive, “to the point that it is no longer easy, or sensible, to draw firm distinctions between 
private and public prisons.” What this indicates is an interest towards a particularly predominant 
penal sensibility, one which ingrains itself into penal systems and cultures and is successful at 
least by analogy with an evolutionary process of speciation (it adapts and survives), whether or 
not it is also successful on a strictly penological evaluation.  
The embeddedness and path-dependency of penal practices mean that mounting fiscal pressures 
alone will not be enough to spur communities and governments rapidly to make significant shifts 
in how they perceive punishment in nature, form, and function. Some observers argue that the 
phenomenon of ‘carceral clawback’ has become so tenacious (Carlen, 2002) that as the carceral 
state has grown “so has the political clout and political acumen of groups, institutions, and 
organizations with vested economic interests in maintaining [it]” (Gottschalk, 2015b: 35). On 
this view prison guards’ unions (Page, 2013), correctional departments at federal or state level(s), 
law enforcement groups, and financial firms are all actors capable of exercising influence of the 
direction of penal policies. Similarly, it is argued, the private corrections industry is another 
entity which devises bonds and other mechanisms to fund and/or ensure the persistence of the 
carceral state and particular forms of punishment (Gottschalk, 2015b). While each may have 
their own particular interests in the shape and size of the carceral state, the outcome may be that   
predominant correctional philosophies, notably the persistent belief in the effectiveness of 
incapacitation, continue to survive and thrive, long after experience and evidence have raised 
serious questions for them. For this reason, whether or not such ideologies were the main 
catalysts for the origins of the carceral state, they can become “major impediments” to reducing 
prison populations significantly, to reining in the carceral state, and to the public’s involvement 
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in reconsidering why certain forms of punishment in our society are allowed to persist 
(Gottschalk, 2015b; see also Gottschalk, 2015a).   
 
Ethical Grounds For and Against Privatizing Corrections 
As Teague (2011: 321) argues, for more than two decades governments in the USA “of both 
Republican and Democratic hues” have resorted increasingly to incarceration and punitive 
measures “as their primary strategy to address crime.” Critics argue that the current reality in 
England and Wales is broadly similar, as the current British government “seeks to continue the 
long-term shift from the welfare state to neoliberalism pursued in various ways by governments 
of both major parties since the late 1970s” (Fitzgibbon and Lea 2014: 25). Although privatization 
is becoming increasingly common in criminal justice systems in a number of Western 
jurisdictions and latterly in other parts of the world (Mason, 2013), the ethical aspects of 
privatizing corrections have received rather patchy attention. Since privatization is developing 
within and expanding across corrections we find it essential to consider the ethical aspects of 
privatizing corrections in tandem with such developments and expansions.  
As Nellis (2006: 105) has indicated in relation to the development of the electronic monitoring of 
offenders (both technologically and as a punitive means) “the questions of ‘what works’ and 
‘what’s right’ cannot, or should not, be so easily separated.” This is crucial to consider, since the 
awareness of potential ethical issues and challenges reveals an urgency to formulate ethically 
sound legislation and regulations for the use and implementation of privatization services 
generally, coupled with the transfer of corrections services from the public to the private sector. 
In terms of ethical considerations, proponents of privatized corrections argue that private 
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companies provide comparable outcomes at less cost and do so without incurring any more harm 
than that associated with correction in the public realm, whereas critics contend that the private 
sector’s profit incentive has the ability to distort motives, resulting in corrupt practices and 
compromised service quality (Logan, 1990, 1992: Lundahl et al., 2009). For example, Welch’s 
(2003: 118) analysis indicates that with a tighter linkage between legislative initiatives and the 
corrections industry, prisoners have increasingly been treated as and reduced to ‘raw materials.’ 
This treatment certainly indicates a degree of warranted concern for the ethical implications of 
reducing these individuals in this way, exacerbating negative feelings towards their dignity, 
integrity, and self-worth. However, other careful and dispassionate observers have found that in 
some instances staff in private prisons may be regarded by prisoners as more humane and 
compassionate than many of their public sector counterparts. This may arise from the fact that 
they see themselves less as the direct agents of the State or as the personal embodiments of its 
punitive authority (Crewe et al. 2015). On this reading the culture of prison staff mediates the 
ways in which people act towards one another; and this may not be reducible to something so 
stark as whether one is a civil servant or employed by a contractor of the state.  International 
experience produces widely differing perspectives on these questions of dignity, equality and the 
protection or otherwise of the human rights implications of private corrections. Courts in some 
jurisdictions have ruled that the very act of delegating the management of prisoners to private 
actors is constitutionally unacceptable. Thus in a famous judgement the Supreme Court of Israel 
(in the case of Academic Center of Law and Business, Human Rights Division v. Minister of 
Finance) struck down new legislation enabling the creation of private prisons on the grounds that 
the delegation of the execution of punishment from the state to a corporate interest intrinsically 
violated the rights of imprisoned persons under the Basic Law of the State of Israel, irrespective 
20 
 
of whether the conditions of confinement or the manner of their treatment were in practice 
inferior or not. The Court held that making inmates “subservient to a private enterprise that is 
motivated by economic considerations . . . is an independent violation [of the right to personal 
liberty] that is additional to the violation caused by the actual imprisonment under lock and key.” 
Furthermore: 
the scope of the violation of a prison inmate’s constitutional right to personal liberty, 
when the entity responsible for his imprisonment is a private corporation motivated by 
economic considerations of profit and loss, is inherently greater than the violation of the 
same right . . . when the entity . . . is a government authority that is not motivated by 
those considerations, even if the term of imprisonment . . . is identical and even if the 
violation of . . . human rights that actually takes place . . . is identical.  
In the Court’s view these consideration were objective and final ones, irrespective of the 
subjective feelings or experiences of the inmate themselves 
(https://reason.org/commentary/israeli-private-prison-ruling/). 
 Criticizing this view, Alexander Volokh argues that if the private agency operates under the 
direction of the state and applies similar operating rules and norms as do its directly state-
managed counterparts, in what sense is it not to be considered “a competent organ of the state”? 
He further argues:  
One can imagine private prisons that are subject to the norms of state actors; certainly, 
the private prison in this case was subject to a lot of state-actor norms. Moreover, that the 
“civil service ethos” is a stronger force against abuse in the public sector than possible 
competitive or other market or contractual forces in the private sector is a contested 
empirical question, which is in tension with the majority’s stated intention to not rest its 
decision on possible future violations. (idem).  
Thus, critics of the Israeli Supreme Court’s view of the matter (including Feeley, 2014) argue 
that it is simply declared rather than reasoned. The judgement treats it as self-evident that the 
delegation of the conduct of imprisonment is an abnegation of responsibility and care on the part 
of the state. This has nothing to do with the question of whether private contractors in fact run 
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inferior prisons, which remains to be shown. (Sometimes they do, sometimes not. They tend to 
do what they are funded and mandated to do. That is both the attraction of private contractors to 
policy-makers and the peril of that policy – to cut a very long story extremely short). Indeed, a 
strict reading of the judgement would suggest that it would remain a violation even if the 
conditions of confinement were in fact preferable (and hence presumably that the prisoner’s own 
estimation of them would be irrelevant). Others, however, would argue that the onus is the other 
way about. We do not need to argue that private prisons are inferior or their operatives other than 
professional and conscientious in order to raise questions about whether the State is entitled to 
draw a line between the imposition and execution of a penalty. This would apply especially in 
the case of a prison sentence in that it entails the continuous imposition of authority over the life 
of the person undergoing punishment by someone. The question of who holds that power is on 
this view crucial to whether it is applied legitimately (Sparks, 1994).  On this account, it is not 
the violation of a right held by the prisoner that is at stake but the failure of the State to carry out 
its own duty, rather than to franchise it to someone else.  
Similar considerations applied (to a somewhat different conclusion) in a German case brought by 
a man confined involuntarily in a privately managed (but non-profit) psychiatric institution in 
Hesse. In that instance the Constitutional Court rejected the application on the grounds that the 
mere fact of being subjected to compulsion by staff who were not civil servants did not amount 
to a violation of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the view 
that Article 33(4) of the Basic Law continues to apply, namely that: “The exercise of sovereign 
authority on a regular basis shall, as a rule, be entrusted to members of the public service who 
stand in a relationship of service and loyalty defined by public law.” In other words, exceptions, 
such as the one the Court identified in this case, are to be interpreted narrowly; and this goes to 
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questions such as the close control and direct supervision of the institution by the state.  The 
operation of the “Democracy Principle” in Article 20(2) of the Basic Law remains primary: “All 
state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections 
and other votes and through specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies” 
(https://reason.org/commentary/privatization-delegation-germany/). This is significant in that 
Germany still has no private prisons: it seems probable that the degree of delegation of 
compulsion involved therein would not be seen as satisfying these requirements, and that what 
Volokh refers to as the ‘legitimacy chain’ would be interpreted as having been broken.   
Even in the United States, practically and spiritually in many ways the home of the privatization 
movement, these principles remain disputed. Thus O’Carroll (2017) argues that the full 
privatization of Federal correctional facilities contravenes both the “exercise of discretion” and 
the “nature of function” tests required under the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act 
of 1998. The Act requires that the “inherently governmental” functions of the federal government 
be performed by government actors whereas its commercial activities may be outsourced to 
private providers. O’Carroll concludes that in key respects – notably the exercise of authority 
over all aspects of inmates’ lives and the imposition of sovereign power in depriving people of 
their liberty – imprisonment must be considered inherently governmental in order to remain 
legitimate.  
One major issue that further complicates these controversies is the recognition that imprisoned 
populations have multiple and complex needs and are overwhelmingly comprised of members of 
poor, marginalized and stigmatized groups. While our basic intuitions about fairness and justice 
indicate that there must be proportionality between the punishment and the level of crime 
committed, in practice punishment can be experienced differently by different groups and 
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individuals (Bülow, 2014). This leads to the worrisome view that some groups and individuals 
will be unfairly punished. Ethically, we must acknowledge the different perspectives existing 
within and between social groups across racialized and classed axes. Per Alexander (2010: 20), 
the experience of African Americans within the US correctional system reflects, in essence, “a 
comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social control” which warehouses 
African Americans. Shockingly, the scale of this system’s disproportionate impact upon African 
Americans (Teague, 2009; Walker et al., 2006) is summarized in Alexander’s (2010: 7) 
observation that the USA incarcerates a greater proportion of its Black population than South 
Africa did at the zenith of apartheid. In terms of privatizing corrections, there is also evidence to 
suggest that African Americans have a greater concern for corruption and human rights abuses 
within private prisons (Ramirez, 2015). Hallett (2006) contends that private prisons have and 
continue to negatively influence African American communities at a disproportionate scale, as 
such facilities reduce the opportunities for rehabilitation and release more so than their public 
counterparts. Indeed “African Americans are used by the private prison industry for the coerced 
production of goods and services. In this manner, slavery was not abolished, but its nature has 
changed” (Ramirez, 2015: 233; see also Alexander, 2010). This can lead to greater political 
disenfranchisement for African Americans, leading to less opportunities for employment and 
deteriorating family and social organizations as a result (Ramirez, 2015).  
Furthermore, imprisonment has been argued to serve as a social control strategy (Sexton and 
Lee, 2006). Private prisons, in particular, reinforce social control strategies as they represent the 
additional space to house minority populations, including but not limited to African Americans, 
Hispanics, and additional minority ethnic communities. Per Myers (1990), as the minority 
populations increase in relative size, social control efforts intensify based on perceived threats to 
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public safety. Such perceptions of threats can manifest as tougher criminal laws and higher 
incarceration rates, all of which directly affect minority populations (Myers, 1990; see also 
Ramirez, 2015). The vastness of social control and punishment practices, which have brought the 
experiences of incarceration particularly closer to the lives of the poor and communities of 
colour, have been extensively explored by scholarship on the emergence of the carceral state 
(Beckett and Murakawa, 2012; Peck, 2003; Wacquant, 2009).  
Moreover, the expansion of surveillance and control through criminal justice systems, including 
probation and parole, substance-abuse treatment, and practices of ‘banishment’ “all point to the 
creative and extensive reach of the carceral state” beyond the conventional threat of incarceration 
into these same lives (Villanueva, 2017: 150; see also Beckett and Herbert, 2010; Belina, 2007; 
Goffman, 2014).  
Teague’s (2016) examination of offender-funded probation in the US paints a grim picture of 
what is lost when probation becomes privatized. Two particular issues arise with the charging of 
fees upfront: “Firstly, whether or not fees are compatible with the philosophy and ethos of 
probation, and secondly, the more pragmatic fiscal question of whether or not charging impedes 
the successful conclusion of supervision” (Teague, 2016: 103). With the survival of the private 
company dependent on its ability to raise revenue and remain competitive in the correctional 
market, this may impact the nature of intervention and delivery of service (Teague, 2011; 2016), 
and following on, one may question whether it is ethical to charge fees for those who cannot pay, 
and what detrimental effects it may have upon their loved ones and communities. As Teague 
(2016: 104) indicates, “[o]ne of the most disquieting results of imposing the role of revenue 
generator on probation practitioners is that they have become embroiled in a system which 
appears to reinforce oppression in terms of race.” Once again, the disproportionality of the reach 
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of the penal arm onto racialized and classed groups in society echoes here of the post-Civil War 
era, “when former slaves were charged with minor offences, then had weighty financial penalties 
imposed upon them. Incarceration followed swiftly when they were unable to pay their debts” 
(Teague, 2016: 104; see also Alexander, 2010).  
In sum, there are significant ethical issues that can arise when privatizing corrections. 
Academics, practitioners, and citizens alike continue to ask questions of ‘what works’ without 
allotting further attention towards issues of ‘what’s right’. Both questions are entangled with 
comprehensive ethical concerns, and a focus solely on the former pays a disservice to the latter. 
We can no longer accept this. The complex issues marginalized groups experience along racial 
and classed axes are exacerbated when we neglect the worrisome effects privatized corrections 
have at present (and will continue to have) within criminal justice systems on both sides of the 
Atlantic, as well as the legal and legislative realms they correspond with in their respective 
societies.  
Under current conditions, given the many-sided extension and diversification of the reach of the 
carceral state, we find ourselves in considerable doubt as to whether the privatization of 
corrections can be undertaken on ethically feasible terms. We need a concrete grasp of what 
constitutes ethically sound conditions for the privatization of corrections, before we can safely 
conclude that any further expansion of these practices is defensible. Clearly, much more work 
still needs to be done to parse out the multiple forms and meanings of the ‘commercialization of 
corrections’ (Jones and Newburn, 2006) and the relations between these and questions of 
persistence, change, scale and variation in contemporary punishment. To cautiously reconsider 
whether we continue down the road of expanding the privatization of corrections is to broach 
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some of the policy implications of this patchwork of practical and ethical challenges, a 
discussion to which we now turn.   
 
Policy Implications  
As we demonstrate above, philosophical and ethical puzzles and challenges concerning the 
privatization of corrections are abundant and unresolved. One overarching theme throughout 
these discussions continues to be how privatization has become a persistent form of punishment 
within our society, spreading throughout correctional practices and procedures in order to take 
shape, survive and thrive. The survival of this form of punishment is a fascinating consideration, 
and merits further empirical investigation into whether, much like the carceral state itself, 
privatization should continue to reign, be reined in, be reversed, or be razed altogether. In this 
spirit, we address several implications for research, theory, and policy below.  
It is no mystery that significant penal policy to slash the incarceration rates in both the USA and 
the UK are needed, and policies which support significant shifts towards comprehensive 
sentencing reforms would also reconsider how probation and parole should be reinvigorated. 
Would such reinvigoration require us to insulate these practices from privatization and from the 
direct heat of politics? Or is this the very sphere in which many actors are required to compete, 
collaborate and co-create a new constellation of services and supports? Is there a single 
meaningful principle that determines which services and interventions can only be provided by 
public servants and which can safely be offered by others and under what contractual terms? 
Does that principle have something to do with the balance in any given intervention between 
compelling and assisting? Or with the fact of confinement as such? Especially in democratic 
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societies, there continues to be a disconnect between punishment policy and what the public 
thinks or wants.  In effect, ethical problems in relying on policies, such as privatization, when the 
public may not want them or even understand remains an interesting aspect of public policy. 
Therefore, this disconnect warrants further attention by academics, practitioners, and citizens.   
In a similar vein to Aman and Greenhouse’s (2014) policy implications, greater attention must be 
accorded towards public involvement, both at the initial contract negotiation stages of expanding 
correctional privatization as well as its rescission. A very real task becomes how to figure out 
and create “a more receptive political environment” (Gottschalk, 2015b: 44) for all citizens 
within modern, liberal democracies to consider penal reforms and policies “and to make the far-
reaching consequences of the carceral state into leading political and public policy issues” 
(Gottschalk, 2015b: 44; see also Mauer, 2011).  
Direct human vulnerability—that is, the impact interventions will have upon the dignity and 
integrity of inmates and other penal subjects—mandates more direct forms of public 
participation that those more impersonal domains of governmental contracts concerning, for 
instance, the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, or routine service contracts “in 
which expenses and revenues may be more definitive” (Aman and Greenhouse, 2014: 359). 
Procedurally, the proposed contract could be made public, perhaps on the government’s or 
company’s own website, not unlike a proposed legislative bill made available for comment. For 
the public to be effectively involved, information could be gathered and made public regarding 
the track records of those seeking the contracts (especially in terms of their corporate 
philosophies, aims and objectives), and information and monitoring must occur throughout the 
duration of the contract once it is awarded to ensure corporate accountability. Should 
privatization of corrections expand, contracts could, at a minimum, include “liability rules that 
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incentivize the private firms to carry out their responsibilities” (Aman and Greenhouse, 2014: 
407) in an ethically appropriate way.  
However, direct human vulnerability is by no means equally distributed within and across 
society; the creation of policies which recognize the diversity of minority populations warrants 
further attention. The extant literature suggests that support for punitive policies in the United 
States tends to be greater among Republicans, conservatives, men, and the religious (Bobo and 
Johnson, 2004; Carr et al., 2007; Johnson, 2007; Ramirez, 2013, 2015). In effect, legislative 
authorities and policymakers alike must see and hear difference; they must recognize the race, 
class, and gender of those whom are part and parcel to the marginalized populations, and they 
must query whether the needs of these populations are effectively and ethically being met. How 
these diverse yet marginalized communities perceive not only justice and punishment, but basic 
standard of living, living conditions, quality of health and wellbeing and legitimate work 
opportunities as they are must be taken into account, in order to reconfigure how we proceed 
going forward.  
While Black, Hispanic, and additional minority ethnic populations are integral to incarceration 
research, their relationship to privatized corrections continues to be under-researched (with 
notable exceptions; see Ramirez, 2015; Petrella, 2014; Petrella and Begley, 2013). As Gottschalk 
(2015b: 32) contends, race matters profoundly, whether it be in discussions of incremental penal 
reforms or more radical debates of how to dismantle the carceral state altogether. These doubly 
marginalized groups (as both racialized and incarcerated) “have been and remain key targets of 
the carceral state” (Gottschalk, 2015b: 33) and therefore should be heard within and throughout 
public policies.  
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Future research must also recognize that the decision to privatize corrections cannot be solely 
attributed to “an ideological commitment to privatization” (Mattera et al., 2001: 7). In other 
words, while privatization may be driven by political or ideological factors (Price and Riccucci, 
2005) the privatization movement may actually reflect criminal justice systems’ utilization of it 
as an economic development tool. This is especially witnessed in economically depressed 
communities which require this financial and economic aid. However, should this be the case, 
we must remain cognizant of the fact that such development through prison or jail construction 
generally or privatization specifically unfortunately does not by any means guarantee the 
generation of economic value for these communities (Mattera et al., 2001; Price and Schwester, 
2010; Russell, 2017). Further empirical studies and policies generated going forward must ensure 
the public becomes aware of the philosophies, goals, and politics underpinning such 
development of prison infrastructure.  
Indeed, discussions of urban versus rural communities and the human vulnerability they face 
from privatized corrections must be redressed in the privatization debate. For example, 
“[h]undreds of rural communities have chased after the illusion that constructing a prison or jail 
will jumpstart their ailing economies” (Gottschalk, 2015: 31), and rural prison development 
contributes to the pervasive depiction of economic viability and attempts to bolster political 
power within rural areas. However, such development also reinforces “forms of punishment that 
destabilize poor urban neighborhoods and harm politically marginalized populations” (Thorpe, 
2015: 618). Developing prison infrastructure in economically distressed communities—
particularly rural ones—rests on the back of a carceral state which upholds a system of racial 
hierarchy and class stratification, and while political representatives have powerful interests in 
protecting rural prison investments, they do so regardless of their actual economic impact in host 
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(rural) communities (Thorpe, 2015). In effect, an expansive carceral state and the further 
privatization of corrections have become immediate and short-term political remedies to rural 
poverty in an increasingly deregulated, globalized economy. While rural prison development 
continues to supply jobs, revenue, and crucial wealth transfers in particularly vulnerable areas, it 
also connects “the immediate stability of lower-class, rural Whites to the continued incarceration 
of predominantly poor urban minorities” (Thorpe, 2015: 631). Going forward, public policy must 
include public involvement in determining whether the detrimental connection between rural and 
urban communities should persist, and how to best support the needs of both communities in a 
more ethical and just manner. We must continue to ask ourselves whether it is ethical to address 
and bolster the needs of one group while hampering the life opportunities of another. 
Furthermore, a startling number of prisons have been built on active and former coal mines, coal 
ash dumps, and other environmentally hazardous locations (for examples, see Russell, 2017). 
Long-term confinement in these rural areas “poses severe and demonstrable health risks to the 
inmate populations through exposure to polluted air and water” (Russell, 2017: 741). Following 
on from such ethical considerations, public policy must also re-examine whether planning prison 
infrastructure development in locations “bearing environmental risks known to cause serious 
illness and death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment” towards inmate populations (Russell, 
2017: 741).   
Finally, it is also imperative that everything is done to assure that offenders, in prison or upon 
release, are no longer a threat to themselves or to society. Policies and programmes which 
emphasize therapeutic integrity and the principles of effective intervention are intended to not 
only assist offenders, but also their loved ones, ranging from parents and children to neighbours 
and their communities as a whole (Lipsey, 2003; Petersilia, 2003). Should privatizing corrections 
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have a viable future, policymakers could do more to spur greater attention towards rehabilitation 
and treatment to enhance public safety and the collective good, regardless if the offender requires 
or seeks services from the public or private sector. Doing so provides another option for the 
general public to get involved in debates on how to deal with people in trouble, providing 
opportunities to produce meaningful change in how we speak and think about the purposes and 
uses for rehabilitation and punishment in our society.   
 
Conclusion  
We recognize that, like much of criminology, an academic focus upon punishment “is 
characterized less by a settled research agenda and agreed parameters of study than by a noisy 
clash of perspectives and an apparently incorrigible conflict of different interpretations and 
varying points of view” (Garland, 1991: 121). Contemporary criminology inhabits a rapidly 
changing world, and criminologists—particularly those who draw upon a sociological 
tradition—continue to “ground their analyses in a nuanced sense of the world as it is, and as it is 
becoming” (Garland and Sparks, 2000: 189). There remain intellectual challenges for 
criminology that are difficult and discomfiting, but which are ultimately too concerning to 
ignore, especially for the progression of contemporary social thought and public policy.  
We - as academics, practitioners and citizens - need to talk about punishment in general, and 
about the challenges of its private provision in particular. The construction of the carceral state 
resulted from a complex set of developments: “No single factor explains its rise, and no single 
factor will bring about its demise” (Gottschalk, 2015b: 34). However, while the carceral state 
may be exceptional in its size and tenacity, “many of the political, economic, and social forces 
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that sustain it and stand in the way of genuine penal reform are not” (Gottschalk, 2015b: 39). 
Greater attention towards the benefits and issues undergirding privatization, from philosophical 
and ethical standpoints, has the potential to reawaken public interest in and sensibilities towards 
how we punish, on whom punishment falls, and whether the punishment we espouse is fair, just, 
and appropriate in its application (Ramsey, 2016). Crime and punishment “play such integrative 
roles in the politics of contemporary societies, are so deeply entangled with our daily routines, so 
deeply lodged in our emotional lives, so vividly represented in our cultural imagination” 
(Garland and Sparks, 2000: 190), that they demand continual, ethically-alert monitoring. Any 
major changes to penal practices, sensibilities, and penal culture will require a multidimensional 
approach, where all components and actors of the criminal justice system must reconsider the 
aims and philosophies of punishment and imprisonment. Without this collaborative coordination 
of thought change we will remain playing “a complex and often futile game of ‘Whack-a-Mole’” 
insofar as single-minded attention on reforming any one or several pieces of the system will not 
necessarily have the desired result sought (Gottschalk, 2015b: 44).  
According to Wright (2010: 74), private prisons, as one of the main areas of privatizing 
corrections, “are here to stay irrespective of empirical findings for or against their existence in 
the corrections industry.” Perhaps he is correct in this assertion, and if this is the case, it is not an 
overwhelmingly positive answer to many of the questions posed in the beginning of the paper, or 
to the existing empirical accounts opposed to privatizing corrections. Yet perhaps Wright is not 
right that private prisons, as one branch of the correctional tree, are ‘here to stay’, or not at least 
forever. As our paper has demonstrated, the philosophical grounds and ethical considerations for 
or against privatizing corrections rely upon particular forms of punishment surviving throughout 
socio-political, historical and cultural developments in crime control and penal policies.  
33 
 
Drawing upon Garland (1990) the persistence of punishment rests upon our ability as a society to 
critically query “our deep attachment to [punishment] and its centrality within our culture, 
vocabulary, and sensibilities” (Sparks, 1994:19). How we view punishment and imprisonment 
(private or otherwise) speaks to how we understand its function within society and the processes 
of legitimacy it negotiates with us continually. Such processes are not stable, fixed, or total; there 
may be one day where the privatization of corrections is considered irreconcilable with societal 
goals, demands, and sensibilities. Indeed, to cast away the notion of privatizing corrections may 
result in certain forms of punishment finally passing away as well. One day we may actually 
uproot the current correctional tree and plant a healthier, humane replacement in its wake.  
Perhaps this will come to fruition, and perhaps not; nevertheless, we endorse “more socially 
conscious and morally charged perceptions of penal affairs” (Garland, 1991: 161). Such 
penological thinking also incorporates and enriches more capacious conceptions of legitimacy, 
insofar as it these perceptions carry “an open and dialectical awareness of change, such that 
every time an attempt at legitimation…appears to promise a new settlement one can begin to 
discern within it the outlines of another emergent set of issues and possibilities and to reach 
towards them” (Sparks, 1994: 26). If we remain at all interested in the assertion that “the very 
purpose of producing knowledge about the social world is to change it” (Garland and Young, 
1983: 32) then in this spirit, we must continue to question the legitimacy of penal arrangements 
in general, and both the public and private systems devised for its delivery in particular. The 
story of privatization is not a new one, but the continuity and persistence of privatization is 
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